Marbury v Madison is famous for establishing the doctrine of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
This case not only detailed how and why judicial review is the proper power of the Supreme Court, this case also:
- Confirmed the President’s power to appointment Federal Judges during the full duration of his term.
- Confirmed the separation of powers and limits of legislative powers.
After Marbury and several other judges petitioned the Legislature for assistance with their Presidential appointments, the Senate refused to deliver the appointments.
The Congress had no Constitutional authority to override the President after appointments were complete, nor did they have the authority in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to override the Constitution by adding certain writ of mandamus* powers.
Background:
After losing re-election to Thomas Jefferson, John Adams remained in office as President until Inauguration Day on
March 4, 1801.
During the interim, Adams and a “lame duck”* Congress passed Judiciary Act of 1801.
The Judiciary Act of 1801 expanded the federal jurisdiction, eliminated Supreme Court circuit duties, and created sixteen federal circuit court judgeships.
Adams filled the newly created positions with lifetime judges – He appointed forty-two judges, whom were dubbed the “midnight judges” due to what some considered a very late in his terms action.
On March 3, then Secretary of State John Marshall, countersigned the commissions appointed by Adams.
On March 4, Thomas Jefferson took office as President and did not allow the deliver of the last four appointments.
Thomas Jefferson (Democrat-Republican Party), and his new Secretary of State, James Madison, considered Adam’s (Federalist Party) actions illegitimate and ignored Marbury’s commission as a refusal to accept Adam’s lifetime appointments.
With the new 1802 term, Democrat-Republicans gained the majority in Congress and repealed the Judiciary Act, abolished the new judgeships and returned jurisdictions under
the Reorganization Act of 1802.
January 1803 – William Marbury, Robert Townsend Hooe and Dennis Ramsay petitioned the Senate to deliver their appointments, but the new Senate denied their petition
(13 yea, 15 nays).
Judge Marbury filed a suit asking the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus.*
The Supreme Court’s writ of mandamus power was authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789.
(To review Judicial Acts text see Judicial Section)
Vocabulary:
*lame duck – When Congress reconvenes following particular November elections, some law makers (and President) are on their way out of office and won’t be participating in the next term. When these Representatives consider various items of business during the interim period it is referred to as a lame duck (reduced ability/power) Congress.
*writ of mandamus - an order by a court to an inferior court/entity or government official to compel fulfillment of their duty/obligation.
Former President John Adam’s former Secretary of State, John Marshall, was appointed Supreme Court Chief Justice in 1801.
In 1803, when the case was brought to the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall was part of the panel of jurists who would hear and decide the case.
3 Questions:
1. Does Applicant have a right to the commission he demands?
2. If Marbury has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of the Country provide a remedy?
3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from the Court?
Responses:
1. Does Applicant have a right to the commission he demands?
Chief Justice John Marshall handed down the decision. Marshall stated in part:
The delivery of the said commission document was not necessary to validate the appointments of the judges, “it was only evidence of the appointment."
Based on the powers conferred on the President, pursuant to Article II, Section 1 and 2,
The President did in fact have the authority and exercised said authority. Article II, Section 2 reads in part: He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . appoint Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . .
The Court stated:
It is then the opinion of the court, first, that by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the president of the United States appointed him a justice of peace, for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States, fixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years.
Secondly, that, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right, to the commission; a refusal to deliver which, is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
2. If Marbury has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of the Country provide a remedy?
The Court found that Marbury had a right to seek help from the Court and the Court had an obligation to assist Marbury in determining what the proper remedy would be to right the wrong.
The Court stated:
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested right.
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of laws, whenever he receives injury.
One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection . . .
3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from the Court? The question extended to asking if an act that violates the Constitution can be enforced as law?
The Court stated in part:
It remains to be enquired whether he is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on, if the nature of the writ applied for, and the power of this court and the nature of the writ. The Supreme Court found that the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which extended the Court’s original jurisdiction – giving the power to issue writs of mandamus was unconstitutional. The Court further stated: The Supreme Court of the United States has not the power to issue a mandamus to a Secretary of the United States, it being an exercise of original jurisdiction not warranted by the Constitution.
The Court's decision addressed the limits of government outlined in the Constitution and the reason why the Congress did not have the power to increase the powers of the judiciary to issue a mandamus in this case, nor have the power to deny the appointed judges their commissions.
The Court stated:
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void. . .
The Constitution specifies the types of cases in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction and those not specified they have appellate jurisdiction. Article III, Section 2, states in part:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . . and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact . . .
The Court opined on its judicial review powers to interpret laws and rules arising under the constitution, the Court stated:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.
If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular motion case so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of the conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty . . . The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.
The Court’s final words:
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States consists and strengthens the principle, supported to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
The rule must be discharged.
Source: Marshall, John, and Supreme Court of the United State, U.S. Reports: Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137. 1803 Periodical.
This important case represents the misguided decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in determining "Separate but Equal" was Constitutional.
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First Amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
(Source: U.S. Constitution)
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The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."
The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow "free trade in ideas"-even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989).
("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
Thus, the First Amendment "ordinarily" denies a State "the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence." Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) . . .
The First Amendment permits "restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are 'of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'" R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, at 382-383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, at 572).
Thus, for example, a State may punish those words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, at 572; see also R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, at 383 (listing limited areas where the First Amendment permits restrictions on the content of speech). We have consequently held that fighting words-"those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction" -are generally proscribable under the First Amendment. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 20 (1971); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, at 572.
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Disclaimer: These resources are created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for use in educational activities only. They may not reflect the current state of the law, and are not intended to provide legal advice, guidance on litigation, or commentary on legislation.
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